The current mobilization policy directs deploying reserve component units to serve at least 365 days on active duty. This policy requires much of the training the mobilized unit previously completed at the mobilization station and after they were mobilized now must be completed prior to their mobilization date to allow maximum use of the mobilized unit's deployment. This paper examines what steps were taken to facilitate this new method of training and how the army can improve these processes to maximize boots on the ground time for each deployment. It will research the advantages of pre-mobilization training conducted at home station. Finally, this paper will examine the responsibility given to each component for pre-mobilization training and recommend how each component can become more efficient in the 21 st century.
MAXIMIZING PRE-MOBILIZATION TRAINING AT HOME STATION
On 19 January 2007 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed reserve component (RC) units would serve a maximum of 12 months on active duty for each deployment. 1 The policy prior to this required each deployed unit to mobilize, train, and then depart for their given theater to serve 365 days "Boots On the Ground" (BOG) 2 in addition to time spent at the mobilization station. With each deployment now limited to a total of 365 days, each post mobilization training day now counts against the 365 total days, leaving fewer days for the unit to serve in its mission during the deployment. This new policy requires that much of the training the mobilized unit previously completed at the mobilization station (MS) after they were mobilized, must now be completed prior to their mobilization.
This SRP examines efforts to enable units preparing for upcoming mobilizations to put BOG as quickly as possible under this new requirement. Tasks mobilized units are currently completing at home station (HS) prior to mobilization are examined in this review as well as suggestions on which additional tasks could be completed at HS to further reduce the post-mobilization requirements. This SRP offers recommendations on how the Army can improve its processes to maximize the BOG portion of each deployment while ensuring that the combatant commander receives RC units fully capable of accomplishing all assigned tasks. Finally, this SRP examines each component's responsibility for pre-mobilization training. To begin, we must first understand the current mobilization process.
There are five phases of mobilization. Phases I and II take place at HS in the premobilization training, then Phases III, IV, and V take place after mobilization. This new policy seeks to reduce the burden of mobilization on RC Soldiers and their Families. By reducing the total length of time for each mobilization, it has accomplished this. But the new policy has created hardships for units training to deploy and for the receiving combatant commanders. This SRP examines current mobilization processes and suggest ways of improving these processes. Each level of command from Department of the Army (DA) on down must be willing to carefully examine their current processes and embrace changes that will allow units to streamline the mobilization process.
Additionally these organizations must update current policies and in some cases seek regulatory changes to facilitate future mobilizations. The Army must strive to identify units required to mobilize up to two years prior to mobilization. 4 However, all deploying units and individual Soldiers must now complete several theater specific tasks not currently outlined in the FR 500-3-3. Tasks such as searching for improvised explosive devices were unheard of when FR 500-3-3 was written. To improve the current mobilization process we must first understand how FR 500-3-3 outlines the mobilization tasks.
These tasks are carried out in five phases: Phase I-Planning, Phase II-Alert, Phase III-Home Station, Phase IV-Mobilization Station, and Phase V-Port of Embarkation. 5 FR 500-3-3 outlines the tasks that the unit must complete during each phase. DA must work closely with NGB and USAR to move as many of the tasks as possible from Phases III, IV, and V into earlier phases of mobilization.
The unit seeks to accomplish Phase I tasks prior to being alerted. Phase I tasks are generally incorporated into the day to day activities of the unit. 6 Upon mobilization, a unit must immediately ensure they complete all Phase I tasks before starting the Phase II tasks. FORSCOM Regulations direct that units will complete all previously required mobilization tasks before moving on to the next mobilization phase. Presently, mobilized units begin Phase II tasks immediately upon alert and complete Phase III tasks at the home station. The earlier units are alerted, the more time they have to complete Phase II and Phase III tasks. Because FORMDEPS is now nearly 10 years old, the unit must work closely with 1 st Army to ensure the tasks they are completing are the tasks that are currently required for mobilization. Phase IV and Phase V tasks are now generally completed at the mobilization station or at the port of embarkation prior to deployment into theater. These Phase IV and Phase V tasks must be reviewed to identify as many of these tasks as possible that the mobilized unit can complete prior to mobilization.
These tasks are generally specified on the theater mobilization requirements list that frequently changes and varies greatly from unit to unit. Today the lists of tasks a unit must accomplish before mobilizing are quite different and more extensive than those listed in FORMDEPS. The effort to coordinate when and where the unit will complete each task requires detailed communication among all entities from the unit through channels to the combatant commander.
FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3 may still be called the Unit Commander's
Handbook, but it no longer provides a reliable list of tasks to be completed to prepare for mobilization. Instead, the commander receives requirements from various sources and encounters changes throughout the mobilization process. Today the best guidance available to the commander is the 1 st Army Commander's Training Tool, which lists tasks the units must train on pre-and post-mobilization; it is generally regarded as the mobilization authority, since FR 500-3-3 has last been updated. 
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DA funds and validates pre-mobilization training requirements. 12 Currently, mobilized Soldiers receive full medical and dental coverage up to 90 days prior to mobilization. However, this is not adequate time for the unit to identify and "fix" all nondeployable Soldiers. DA should change regulations to extend the start of medical and dental health care to 365 days prior to a unit's deployment so Soldiers have sufficient opportunity to become medically ready before mobilization. This will allow units to identify Soldiers that will not be deployable early in the pre-mobilization process, then the units can train the Soldiers they will deploy with. The more training that is moved to the pre-mobilization phases, the more imperative it is that the Soldiers trained are those able to deploy. This requirement will require statutory as well as regulatory changes.
FORSCOM specifies the required training tasks for alerted units so the units have a checklist prior to their deployment. 13 The Adjutants General in each state certify all training completed in the premobilization phase. 16 The alerted units are responsible for meeting individual and collective training requirements in accord with the NGB Five-Year Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 17 Training Strategy. 18 The unit commander completes a training status report that tracks completed tasks following each training event. This training status report records the number of Soldiers that completed the training by individual task. The training status report provides the unit commander with a single document that identifies the unit's training progress. After completing pre-mobilization training, the unit forwards this documentation to the 1st Army mobilization assistor and the Adjutant General when they complete pre-mobilization training and to their higher headquarters upon arrival at the Mobilization Station (MS). 19 Finally, the unit is responsible for requisitioning ammunition and other training requirements for pre-mobilization training.
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Pre-Mobilization Training at Home Station. The more tasks units complete at home station during the pre-mobilization phase, the less training they will require after mobilization. This provides the combatant commander greater availability of the mobilized unit because a smaller portion of their deployment has been spent on postmobilization.
In order to assist National Guard units with their home station training, NGB established Post-Mobilization Training and Assistance Elements (PTAEs) in each state and territory. These PTAEs contribute greatly to alerted units' pre-mobilization training.
The PTAE headquarters consists of three individuals-a lieutenant colonel, a major and a master sergeant or sergeant major. 21 In addition to the headquarters, the PTAE consists of training assistors who help alerted units to prepare for upcoming deployments with training support. Ideally these assistors are selected traditional
Guardsmen recently returned from deployment and released from active duty. They are placed on Title 32 Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) status. 22 The NGB currently plans to authorize one training assistor for every 60 Soldiers deployed. 23 The Observer Controller/Trainer Academy at Camp Shelby, MS, certifies these assistors prior to sending them out to train units. The Army National Guard is also planning to develop a National Guard Assistor Academy 24 which would provide the National Guard unit assistors that are currently provided by 1 st Army in addition to those provided by PTAEs. National Guard assistors can provide better service and then 1 This requires FORSCOM to identify the unit to be mobilized two years prior to the actual mobilization date. 29 Secondly, the unit should be alerted a minimum of 365 days prior to the mobilization. This alert provides many benefits to NGB, to the state and to the unit.
30
The alerted unit can then enact the "stop loss" policy, which stabilizes the unit's personnel and authorizes funding for certain services, such as dental exams, to improve the unit's overall readiness. 31 Current regulations allow the unit to enact "stop loss" only 90 days prior to mobilization. This creates difficulties for the commander who is trying to validate those who will mobilize. 32 The unit needs this full year to ensure they conduct the pre-mobilization training with Soldiers that will deploy. Without one year "stop loss", forward, but has yet not provided maximum efficiency to the mobilization process.
This training strategy is conducted in a five-year model that supports ARFORGEN requirements. A returning unit spends the first two years in the model reconstituting (year one) and training (year two). These two years should ideally be three to four years in advance of the next mobilization for the unit. The next two years of the training model are spent training on tasks for the deployment. In the ARFORGEN model, the unit is notified that they have been selected to deploy as they start year three of the cycle, then they are formally alerted at the start of year four of the cycle. During the fifth year of the model, the unit is deployed. The third classification of units is those who conduct their mission off of the base camp. Units conducting security duty would be good examples of this type of unit.
These units should be able to conduct their post-mobilization training in 60 days or less. 48 These units generally train on all tasks assigned to the first two categories; additionally they will train on specific combat related tasks. Obstacles to Overcome. Some critics will contend that the post-mobilization process cannot be shortened. Clearly it will not be easy to increase the BOG for deploying units. Second, all components must work to build a greater level of cooperation. While the current cooperation between components is probably unprecedented, roles and relationships must be completely redefined to achieve maximum efficiency. In the past there have been occasions when evaluators did not accept all training the mobilized units had completed unless they had physically observed that training. All entities must be able to validate required tasks that are performed to eliminate any repetitious training. Again, 1 st Army and their mobilization stations have made great strides in this area. Continued coordination between NGB, USAR, and 1 st Army will streamline the mobilization process even further. Observer/controllers or evaluator assets should be shared freely among active duty installations, the National Guard, and the Army
Reserve. The ensuing ability to surge assets will create greater efficiencies and provide better training to mobilized units.
Third, planning and forecasting at all levels must improve. The Army must forecast out 730 days which units will mobilize for any conflict. 54 It is better to alert a unit and then decide not to deploy the unit than it is to tell a unit to deploy inside of that 730 day window. This 730-day window is the key to providing the unit the resources of time and money that it needs to prepare at home station. If FORSCOM alerts a unit for deployment but does not deploy the unit, they have spent some training dollars on a unit that is not deploying immediately. But in return, they have gained a highly trained unit.
This unit is immediately ready to deploy to any contingency. 
Recommendations
First, FORSCOM, in cooperation with NGB and the USAR, must re-write FR 500-3-3 to accurately reflect the current combatant commanders' requirements. The reserve component commander should be able to refer to a single reliable document to identify all of his mobilization requirements, rather than the current ad hoc approach.
Second, all components should review all of their policies and procedures to identify how they can create efficiencies to better forecast the units that will deploy.
Further, they must adequately fund those units early enough in the ARFORGEN cycle to allow the units to train on all required mobilization tasks. This will require not just policy changes but changes in funding regulations.
Third, all components should have full authorization to validate any training the mobilized unit completes in pre-mobilization or post-mobilization training. All RC component training should focus on the deployment criteria, rather than the units' Mission Essential Task List (METL), for the 36 months preceding their deployment.
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Fourth, the Army must reduce the post mobilization time for RC BCTs to 60 days or less. Many of the current requirements can be reduced or eliminated because these units have already deployed and are better trained than they were for their first deployment. All agencies and components must work together to move a significant number of tasks currently specified in Phases III, IV and V to Phases I and II for all RC units, not just the BCTs. Again, this requires early forecasting and resourcing for units projected for deployments.
Fifth, the Army must request legislative changes to enable the reserve components to provide comprehensive medical and dental coverage a full 12 months prior to deployment. This coverage will enable RC Soldiers to become medically and dentally qualified for deployment. It will not only provide increased readiness for the unit but will also identify those Soldiers unfit for mobilization early in the process. Early identification of non-deployable Soldiers allows the unit to find replacements that still have time to complete their mobilization training.
Sixth, Department of Defense (DoD) must fund adequate regional training centers for RC units capable of facilitating all mobilization tasks, such as live fire ranges.
There must be enough training centers so that all units can utilize these centers on a normal drill weekend without spending the majority of the weekend travelling to and from the centers. These centers will not merely improve training for mobilized units, but for all units in the geographical area.
Seventh, the Army, USAR, and NGB must improve cooperation for providing observer/controllers for mobilized units. Observer/controllers from one component must While everyone agrees that reducing post-mobilization time is a good thing and would say that they are willing to implement the suggested changes, it is quite another thing to actually restructure budgets, change validation processes, and give up some control over the way the Army currently conducts post-mobilization training. All entities must agree that units can train on all required tasks in the pre-mobilization phase and then identify which of those tasks cannot be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.
Then they must put all options on the table and give the unit commander the ability to develop his training plan from start to finish. These changes will require cultural changes, such as allowing the unit commander to forgo some required training that he feels his unit is already trained on, to go above and beyond the steps taken so far. We should strive to reduce post mobilization training time even further by moving even more training into the pre-mobilization phase.
Reducing post-mobilization training time will not be easy. Some mobilization stations are not currently resourced to provide adequate training areas and ranges for all required tasks. We must resource every state with funds for additional training to accomplish these tasks and resource all regional training facilities with required training sites. Again, these training areas will serve not only to the alerted units, but all other units in that area.
Contingencies will arise that require units unavailable according to the ARFORGEN model so plans and policies must be in place to ensure a unit called up on a short notice can still maximize their BOG.
It is important to note that most units called up now have previous mobilization
experience. Leaders at all levels should consider this fact and determine which premobilization and post-mobilization tasks they can abbreviate or eliminate from the task lists for these previously deployed units.
The cost savings of reducing post-mobilization time outweigh any costs incurred during the pre-mobilization training. 56 The most compelling reason to reduce the post mobilization training time is the benefit to the Combatant Commander who can acquire units that are in theater longer per deployment; this improves the stability of his forces.
Also, there are significant cost savings for activating fewer reserve units to execute a war over the same extended period. Not only will these longer rotations save money, they will increase overall performance of the units that do deploy. Endnotes 3 Latest Arrival Date (LAD) is the last day that the mobilized unit can arrive in theater. For example, if a unit is mobilized and required by the theater commander on 1 September 2008, the unit must be trained and transported to arrive in theater on or before that date. Units typically arrive a few days prior to their LAD. A unit that can not arrive on or before their arrival date must work closely with 1 st Army and the Combatant Commander to clearly communicate their date of arrival in theater and their reason for missing their LAD. The unit they are replacing may have to stay longer than they were scheduled to because of this delay.
4 FR 500-3-3 is still the applicable regulation for mobilization, but has been effectively superseded by other task lists and 1 st Army directives. FORSCOM will soon revise FR 500-3-3. 10 Combatant commanders can provide Training Readiness Oversight (TRO) to units projected to mobilize into their geographic commands, but do not have actual command authority over those units until the unit is mobilized. Typically a cooperative arrangement between the combatant command and the peace time headquarters is made where the unit takes training guidance from both commands, but in case of conflict takes guidance from the peace time command.
11 Noyes, 23 February 23, 2007. 25 Having unit assistors in each state provides better coverage to the units because historically unit assistors from 1 st Army commonly have conflicts with more than one of their units training on the same days. Travel accounts go much farther if the assistor is driving down the road one hour to observe training than if the assistor needs to fly across the country to observe training. 1 st Army is currently required to support units with training assistors, but lack of personnel and travel funds have prevented them from attending all unit pre-mobilization training. 26 Speidel Interview, September 2, 2008. 27 Ibid.
28 Warrior tasks and battle drills are tasks that individual Soldiers and units must be able to perform respectively before they deploy into theater. These lists were developed by combatant commanders after FR 500-3-3 was written. Units now train on these tasks in addition to METL tasks before they deploy. 29 FORSCOM provides the majority of forces. PACOM and USAREUR are also force providers. Requiring notification 730 days prior to mobilization is probably the most difficult piece of reducing post mobilization training requirements, but is critical to provide the units time to fully train. To date, force requirements for brigade and battalion size elements have been relatively accurate and somewhat easier to predict. Combatant commanders have had more difficulty forecasting small units and low density MOSs 730 days out. This forecast will never achieve 100% accuracy, but should remain the combatant commander goal to achieve maximum training efficiency. It is unrealistic to project all force requirements. For instance, nobody could foresee the requirements on 10 SEP 01, but to clearly improvements can be made in this area. The Army must plan and project as well as possible to provide early notification to as many of the required units as possible. 30 The alert helps the unit by authorizing "stop loss". This allows the unit to identify personnel shortfalls for mobilization. The state will attempt to fill all shortages identified by the unit and will "pass back" any vacancies that it can't fill to the NGB. The sooner NGB gets this "pass back" from the states, the sooner they can go to other states for assistance in filling positions that the original state could not fill. 31 Currently, units first receive a notification for training that tells the unit and their chain of command that they are being considered for mobilization. This gives the unit time to transfer Soldiers into the unit to bring the unit up to acceptable personnel standards and to identify Soldiers that may not be deployable. The unit receives official notification that they will be mobilized when they receive their alert order. This order allows them additional training dollars and benefits to the alerted unit's Soldiers. 32 Abernathy Interview, 1 October 2008. 33 Ibid. 34 Moore, "Army National Guard Pre-Mobilization Conference, Slide 10. 35 Ibid.
36 COL Robert A Moore, Chief, Training Division, NGB, "ARNG Training Strategy 'Setting the Conditions' for the Operational Force," briefing, July 28, 2008, Slide 2. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., Slide 5. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.
41 A reserve component unit is normally authorized 48 drill assemblies and 15 days of annual training in one training year. An alert unit is authorized 55 drill assemblies and 22 days of annual training the year prior to mobilization. Additionally, the unit is authorized 19 days of ADSW to prepare for the upcoming mobilization. 42 Moore, "ARNG Training Strategy 'Setting the Conditions' for the Operational Force," Briefing, Slide 5. 43 Relief in place/Transfer of authority is the process incoming and outgoing units use to replace each other. The incoming unit comes in to "Relief" the unit that is completing their deployment. The outgoing unit does their best to ensure they pass all relevant information to the incoming unit so the new unit can be successful. Transfer of Authority takes place when the incoming unit is satisfied that they are ready to assume responsibility for the mission, thereby releasing the outgoing unit of their responsibility for the mission.
